One-Anaphora is not Ellipsis[*]

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A NAPHORIC *ONE* is an indefinite nominal pro-form that takes NP antecedents. There have been at least two references to the derivation of anaphoric *one* made in the recent literature. Elbourne (2001:247–249) makes brief mention of it, whereas Harley (2007) presents it as a problem in and of itself. Though their approaches differ both in analytical approach as well as empirical coverage, these authors both assume in their analyses that noun phrase ellipsis (henceforth NPE) is implicit in the phenomenon.

The main point that I would like to argue in this paper is that *one*-anaphora is not a reflex of NPE, nor does it involve any sort of ellipsis. To wit, *one*-anaphora does not behave like NPE or other true elliptical phenomena. In order to show this, I employ three established diagnostics used to distinguish ellipsis from other forms of anaphora and anaphoric processes:[1] the missing antecedent phenomenon (Grinder & Postal 1971, Bresnan 1971), extraction from ellipsis sites (Schuyler 2001, Aelbrecht 2010), and syntactic versus pragmatic control (Hankamer & Sag 1976). The results of these three diagnostics comprise a relatively clear reason to reject the idea that NPE is involved in the derivation of *one*-anaphora.

This paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I provide some syntactic background on the phenomenon of *one*-anaphora. In §2, I discuss the two approaches against which I wish to argue and show that they cover two different sets of data. In §3, I examine both sets of *one*-anaphora data with the three tests noted above and compare the results to other established elliptical phenomena—namely NPE and VPE. In §4, I discuss some implications and conclude.

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1   There is a fourth diagnostic that is commonly used. Ellipsis usually requires that the antecedent and elided constituent be syntactically parallel. Roughly, this means that arguments must occur in the same place in the syntactic structure in both the antecedent and the elided phrase (see Merchant 2007 for a thorough discussion). This is fairly easy to test with VP anaphora, but it is not straightforward to look at in *one*-anaphora, so I leave this diagnostic aside.

1   Background

One anaphors are elements of DPs that stand in an anaphoric relation with some other material. They can either occur on their own, as in (1), or more deeply embedded in the DP, as in (2).

(1)   John has a cookie, and I want <u>one</u> too.

(2)   John has a cookie, and I want a big <u>one</u>.

In older transformational theories, *one*-anaphora was thought to literally replace part of a NP. The target for this replacement, typically N′, was material that could be recovered anaphorically (Jackendoff 1971). Under the DP theory (Abney 1987), it became clear that NP should be the target, and modern approaches now assume something along these lines (see Harley 2007).

The reason researchers believe that NP must be the target—or, to put it more accurately, that NPs serve as antecedents for the phenomenon—has to do the size of potential antecedents and the material that can appear with *one*. *One* can be anaphoric on all of the descriptive content of a nominal, as shown in (3). Here, we see that the anaphor picks up both the noun phrase *student of physics* as well as the modifying adjective *tall*. It need not do this, however. As (4) shows, it can pick up the smaller NP, leaving out the adjunct. Direct arguments of antecedent noun, however, cannot occur with the *one* anaphor. This is demonstrated in (5). This means that the antecedent can be no smaller than NP.

(3)   This tall student of physics is Mary, and that one is Sally.
        (one = *tall student of physics*)

(4)   This tall student of physics is Mary, and that short one is Beth.
        (one = *student of physics*)

(5)   * This student of physics is Mary, and this one of chemistry is Lila.
        (one ≠ *student*)

The antecedent for anaphoric *one* must also be smaller than DP. To illustrate this, consider the sentences in (6) and (7). There is an anaphoric *one* in the second sentence in each example. *One* is understood in (6) to mean *a goat*, and in (7) to mean simply *goat*. Crucially, neither is interpreted as *this goat*, nor does it refer to the same goat referenced in the first sentence. Thus, *one* appears to be anaphoric on material inside DP, but not on a DP itself.

(6)   This goat is pretty small. I have one at home and it's much larger.

(7)   This goat is pretty small. I have a big one at home, though.

The standard assumption, then, is that the antecedent for *one* must be a NP and not just a head.[2]

(8)

DP ← Not a valid antecedent

D   NP ← Valid antecedent

YP   NP ← Valid antecedent

Adjunct   N   XP

Not a valid antecedent

Argument

Of course, *one*-anaphora is not the only anaphoric phenomenon that takes NP antecedents. Noun phrase ellipsis also does, just as the name suggests. This fact leads to the very tempting and somewhat intuitive idea that the two processes are actually different reflexes of one underlying phenomenon. Since NPs antecede both NPE and anaphoric *one*, it is appealing to suggest this for fear of missing a generalization.[3] This idea that *one*-anaphora and ellipsis are somehow linked seems to be assumed in the analyses that I turn to now.

2   Recent Approaches

In this section I introduce two NPE-based approaches to *one*-anaphora. The first is one suggested in Elbourne 2001, which assumes relatively traditional syntactic assumptions. The second is the analysis in Harley 2007. This analysis is based in Distributed Morphology (Halle & Marantz 1993), and it posits that *one*-anaphora is a special case of vocabulary insertion into category defining heads triggered by ellipsis.

2.1   *Elbourne 2001*

Elbourne (2001:247–249) suggests that, at least in some instances, anaphoric *one* can be explained as NPE after an indefinite determiner. The idea is not an entirely new one. Predating Elbourne's suggestion, Perlmutter (1970) had the idea that the indefinite determiner in English was actually just a reduced form of *one*, and Elbourne's suggestion, in some sense, revives this idea by equating the two. Elbourne's interest in this stems partially from his desire to show that NPE after a determiner is not unusual in English. His main objective is

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2   Given Bare Phrase Structure (Chomsky 1995), however, the structural distinction between complement and modifier is immaterial when there is no complement. In this situation, modifiers can be sisters to heads. Harley (2007) focuses on explaining how to account for the facts presented above assuming bare phrase structure. I will not treat them here, since this is not my primary concern. I will instead assume that there is some structural distinction between complements and modifiers.

3   As Jackendoff (1971:28) discusses, *one*-anaphora was once considered to be an intermediate step between a full NP and deletion.It is worth noting that he quickly rejects this approach due to the fact that *one*-anaphora cannot take mass noun antecedents but NPE can. This is a critical fact that may well be a problem for Harley's analysis, but for space reasons, the relevant discussion is not included in this squib.

to argue that *the* and *it* are just morphological variants of each other, each occurring in different situations. Basically, his thesis is that when there is NPE after *the*, it gets pronounced as *it*.

Given such an assumption, one could counter that it seems strange that the definite determiner licenses NPE while the indefinite *a* does not, but Elbourne suggests that *a* does in fact permit the ellipsis of its complement. Just as *the* is sometimes pronounced *it* under his theory, *a* gets pronounced as *one* when its complement is unpronounced. This, he implies, is nice because it fills in a paradigm gap. Elbourne observes that most determiner(-like) elements in the DP seem to license NPE, but *a* does not.[4]

There are clearly some places where *one* cannot be the indefinite determiner, particularly when it occurs below an overt determiner and other higher material in the DP:

(9)   I want a big <u>one</u>.   (10)   I only want one big <u>one</u>.

The cases in question are those where *one* occurs by itself. These cases I take to be the ones where Elbourne thinks that *one* and the indefinite determiner can be equated (that is, where $one \equiv a + \langle \text{NP} \rangle$).[5] Since it is only a suggestion, I will fill out the idea a little more here and try to provide a bit of evidence for why one would be inclined to believe such a claim, using argumentation similar to that which Elbourne used to promote the claim that *it* is equivalent to $the + \langle \text{NP} \rangle$.

The claim is not a particularly outlandish one, provided one assumes some sort of late—that is, post-syntactic—lexical insertion that is sensitive to things like ellipsis. Linking the two should not be thought of as particularly troublesome, since ellipsis is widely believed to also be a post-syntactic phenomenon, preserving syntactic material but deleting its pronunciation (Merchant 2001, Goldberg 2005). Lexical insertion probably needs to be sensitive to things like ellipsis, anyway. The possessive determiner *my* and the possessive pronoun *mine*, for instance, could be construed to be the same element. The only difference is that *mine* is the pronunciation of *my* with a null complement (*i.e., mine* $\equiv my + \langle \text{NP} \rangle$).

A further piece of argumentation is that the indefinite determiner seems to license NPE in many languages. In example (11), we can see this in Swedish, where the indefinite article,

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4   Determiner(-like) elements include determiners, numerals, and various quantificational elements. For reasons of space, I am not going to list every case that Elbourne does. The reader is referred to Elbourne 2001:248 for his summary. See also Dahl 1984, Ch. 2, for a more in-depth discussion.

5   I use angled brackets and strike-through here and throughout to represent ellipsis.

homophonous with the numeral meaning *one*, is stranded. We see something similar in Spanish in (12).[6]

(11)   Swedish

a. Köpte du *en* blå bil?   b. Ja, jag köpte *en*.
    bought you a   blue car   yes I   bought one
    Did you buy a blue car?   Yeah, I bought one.

(12)   Spanish

a. ¿Compraste *una* casa   nueva?   b. Sí, compré   *una*.
    bought.2nd a   house new   yes bought.1st one
    Did you buy a new house?   Yeah, I bought one.

These languages are related to English, but the English indefinite determiner does not overtly appear to license NPE.

(13)   English:

a.   Did you buy a new house?   b.   * Yes, I bought a.

This is not entirely expected. If the indefinite determiner licenses NPE in other languages, we might expect that it should do so in English as well. It is notable that English speakers will use *one* in place of *a* in cases like (13)—this is certainly what the translations of (11) and (12) suggest. Furthermore, it seems to be the case that (14a) and (14b) are equivalent in meaning:

(14)   Did you buy a new house?

a.   Yes, I bought one.
b.   Yes, I bought a new house.

Equating *a* with anaphoric *one* would permit us to tie these facts together. Since ellipsis is deletion on the PF branch but not on the LF branch, ellipsis of a NP after *one* captures the equivalence of (14a) and (14b), since the NP in (14a) would still be sent to the semantics for interpretation. By hypothesis, then, the indefinite determiner simply gets different forms in different environments in English. Thus, the only reason *a* looks like it does not license ellipsis is because it has a different morphological form when it does:

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6   This may only be superficial in Spanish. The masculine indefinite article *un* does not match the stranded element *uno*. Intriguingly, *uno* is homophonous with the numeral for *one*.

(15)   Did you buy a new house? Yes, I bought one.[7]

a.
```
            DP                              b.            DP
          /    \                                        /    \
         D      NP                                     D      ⟨NP⟩
         |     /  \                                    |     /    \
     [indef]  AP   NP                              [indef] ⟨AP⟩   ⟨NP⟩
         ⋮    /\    /\                                 ⋮    /\     /\
         a  new  house                               one ⟨new⟩ ⟨house⟩
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
2.2 Harley 2007

Harley's (2007) analysis is couched in the technology of Distributed Morphology (Halle
& Marantz 1993), henceforth DM. Under this theory, the contentful material of lexical vo-
cabulary is called a root ($\sqrt{}$). Roots sit in syntactic terminals and do not have any inher-
ent category. The material in syntactic terminals is essentially bundles of features. A post-
syntactic process of Vocabulary Insertion (VI) is sensitive to these features and determines
which vocabulary items are inserted into the terminals after spell-out to the PF branch. The
item that is eventually inserted is the one that matches the highest number of features in
the bundle and must match or contain a subset of the features in the terminal.

   The feature bundles themselves can be manipulated with typical syntactic operations
that are available to the syntax, such as Merge and Move. Roots are combined with special
categorizing heads that provide the roots with their syntactic category. Thus the difference
between *study physics* and *student of physics* is represented syntactically as in (16) and (17).[8]
The root is head-moved to the categorizing head—$v°$ for verbs and $n°$ for nouns—and
adjoins.

(16)   study physics
```
           vP                    ⟶              vP
          /   \                               /    \
        v°     √P                           v°      √P
         |    /  \                          /\      /  \
        -y   √    DP                     study √    √    DP
             |    /\                        ↖___/   /\
          stud- physics                          physics
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(17)   student (of) physics

Harley's theory exploits the hypothesis that syntactic terminals are feature bundles. She proposes that ellipsis under DM is a special case of VI. Ellipsis, under this hypothesis, involves inserting a special feature, which she labels $[+Id]$, into each terminal in an elided phrase. There are only a handful of vocabulary items that are specified $[+Id]$, and this includes a null item $\emptyset$ which is only specified $[+Id]$. Since the feature $[+Id]$ is a subset of the features on nodes marked for ellipsis, and since most VIs will be specified $[-Id]$, VI will normally insert $\emptyset$ into those terminals.

One-anaphora is meant to be derived by a similar process. Whereas VI will insert $\emptyset$ into most terminals specified $[+Id]$, there is a different vocabulary item specified with the features $[n°, +Id]$. This item is *one*. Since it matches more of the features of the $[+Id]$-marked $n°$ than $\emptyset$ does, it will be inserted.[9]

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9   In order to account for the ellipsis of nouns under VPE, Harley (2007) has to stipulate that a $[+Id]$ $n°$ still spells out as $\emptyset$ when it is commanded by another $[+Id]$ head. This may well work for VPE, but as far as I can tell the theory has no way of generating NPE. Harley's theory predicts that the following should be grammatical:

(1)   * Mary's house is small, but John's one is pretty big.

This is because the noun that should be elided after *John's* will have to spell out as *one* under this theory, but anaphoric *one* cannot occur adjacent to the possessive (Dahl 1984). One would need to further stipulate that $n°$, $[+Id]$ spell out as $\emptyset$ in this condition too. Perhaps the real problem for this theory are the few places

(2)   Mary's house is big. It's the biggest (one) I've ever seen.

I leave this aside here. The arguments in §3 will show independently of this problem that NPE and anaphoric *one* are not related.

(18) that short one

```
                          DP
                ┌──────────┴──────────┐
                D                     nP
                                ┌──────┴──────┐
                                A            nP[+Id]
                                        ┌─────┴─────┐
                                      n°[+Id]      √P[+Id]
                                              ┌──────┴──────┐
                                          √stud−[+Id]      DP[+Id]
                that       short       one       ∅            ∅
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
2.3 Summary

Although Elbourne's and Harley's analyses are notably different, both rely on NPE to derive *one*-anaphora. It is worth noting that Elbourne's approach would capture a different set of data from what Harley's would, even though they both treat NPE as being implicit in the derivation of *one*. As discussed earlier, Elbourne's account only seems fit to handle cases of bare *one* without any determiners since it promotes the view that *one* is a determiner. On the other hand, Harley's only seems capable of getting cases where *one* appears embedded deeper within the DP. This is because NPE does not target the whole DP. Rather, NPE is licensed by a higher determiner, and we can expect that determiner to be stranded by ellipsis (Lobeck 1995).

   Since these two approaches seem to handle different sets of empirical data, I will treat bare *one* and embedded *one* as though they are separate phenomena in the coming discussion. What I intend to show is that NPE is not involved in the derivation of *one*-anaphora at all and that the supposition that it is has no empirical basis.

3 *One*-anaphora vs. NPE

Both of the theories discussed above take for granted that ellipsis is implicit in the derivation of *one*-anaphora, but if *one* anaphora involves anything like NPE then it ought to behave like ellipsis in general. In this section, I use a number of diagnostics to show that this is in fact not the case—*one*-anaphora does not behave like ellipsis.

3.1 Missing antecedents

Missing antecedents are antecedents for pronouns that are not pronounced but are still active in the syntax (Grinder & Postal 1971). These commonly occur in VPE, as demonstrated in (19a). Presumably, the indefinite that establishes the referent for *he* in this example is a DP in the deleted VP, since, to use the terminology of Heim (1982), indefinites in the scope

of negation cannot establish discourse referents, as (19b) shows.

(19) a. Mary has never met a dwarf, but Sally has ___, and he was very short.

b. # Mary has never met a dwarf, and he was very short.

Bresnan (1971) argues that missing antecedents can be found in elided material, and Hankamer & Sag (1976:407) show that, contra Grinder and Postal's original claim, bare *one* anaphora does not permit missing antecedents. As they note, in (20) it is difficult to construe the pronoun *it* as referring to anything other than the boat that George sank; thus, it is ungrammatical on the intended reading where the gorilla in the boat that George sank drowned.

(20) * Harry didn't sink a boat carrying a gorilla, but George sank one, and it drowned.

Additionally, embedded *one* does not license missing antecedents either:

(21) * Harry didn't sink the large boat carrying a gorilla, but George sank the small one, and it drowned.

Based on this, Hankamer & Sag (1976) conclude that *one* is not the result of ellipsis.

A crucial counterpoint to these data is the observation that NPE does in fact license missing antecedents, as Chisholm (2001:11) notes:

(22) I believed no one's claim that he had ridden a camel, except for John's ___. He said it was the two-humped variety.

Thus, with respect to missing antecedents, *one* anaphora behaves differently from NPE.

3.2 *Extraction*

Movement is generally possible out of elided material. That is, ellipsis does not seem to interfere with movement chains whose bases are in an elided phrase. This is well attested for VPE (Schuyler 2001), which permits both A′-extraction and A-extraction:[10]

(23) a. A′-extraction:
Nobody doubts that Jan can eat a lot of cake, but it's not clear how much$_i$ she actually will ⟨eat ~~t_i~~⟩.

b. A-extraction:
The ship$_i$ sank t_i quickly, but the barge$_k$ won't ⟨~~sink t_k quickly~~⟩.

Sluicing (or IP ellipsis) (Ross 1969, Merchant 2001), typically requires *wh*-movement out of the ellipsis site:

(24) Mary bought something, but I don't know what$_k$ ⟨~~Mary bought t_k~~⟩.

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10 In languages that have V-to-T movement, it is possible to move a head out of the VPE site, as well (Goldberg 2005). It is tricky to show that this happens in English since it lacks V-to-T movement generally, but possessive *have* does raise to T in some British dialects and can originate in an ellipsis site (see Potsdam 1997:§5.2).

Since movement is generally possible out of the site of ellipsis, we should expect that movement is possible out of the site of NPE. Therefore, if *one*-anaphora is derived via NPE, it should allow movement out too.

First, let us look at what would need to be the case for Elbourne's approach. We know that some A′-extractions are possible out of indefinite DPs:

(25)   Who$_i$ did John take a picture of t_i?

If *one* is really just *a* followed by a null complement, then we should expect extraction to be possible. However, it is not.

(26)   * Who did Mary take a picture of, and who did John take one?

Recall, that there is no independent reason to think that ellipsis should block extraction and that (25) shows extraction to be good out of the intended NP. Therefore, this data suggests that bare *one* does not involve NPE, since extraction should be possible. Turning to the cases of embedded *one* that Harley's analysis attempts to handle, we see the same thing:

(27)   ? Who did John take a big picture of?

(28)   * Who did Mary take a small picture of, and who did John take a big one.

Nothing about Harley's analysis provides any reason to think that there should be a difference between (27) and (28), or that (28) should be bad. The two NPs should be equivalent, modulo [+Id] marking.[11] Again, the data from *one*-anaphora here do not pattern with ellipsis.

I should mention that one ought to take this data with a reasonable bit of caution. Despite the fact that extraction out of ellipsis sites seems to be possible in general, it is hard to verify whether it is possible extract out of NPE sites in particular. As Chisholm (2001:11–12) notes, extraction out of elided NPs in DPs that are known to license NPE is independently bad. For example, this is the case with possessives, as (29) shows. This plausibly because extraction out of their unelided equivalents is also bad, as demonstrated in (30).

(29)   * You saw my picture of Ted, but who did you see Mary's?

(30)   * Who$_i$ did you see Mary's picture of t_i?

So, it is hard to directly tell whether extraction from the site of NPE is possible. Despite this potential objection, if NPE and VPE and sluicing are different reflexes of the same process, as argued by Lobeck (1995), Chisholm (2001) and LaCara (2010), then data like (26) would still be surprising since there does not appear to be any reason that ellipsis should block extraction only in the case of NPE. Therefore, I believe that this constitutes good evidence against an NPE-based approach to anaphoric *one*.

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11   This should not make a difference. If it did, then extraction out of VPE sites and out of sluices should also be bad.

3.3   Pragmatic Control

The strong position in ellipsis theory is that true ellipsis must have a linguistic antecedent, whereas pronominal and deep anaphora can be controlled by material in the surrounding (non-linguistic) context; that is to say, they can be controlled pragmatically (Hankamer & Sag 1976). It does seem, in general, to be harder to license ellipsis without a linguistic antecedent.

(31)   *Situation: You and your friend walk into a room and all the windows are broken. Your friend says:*

    a.   # Oh no! I wonder who did!   VPE

    b.   Oh no! I wonder who did this!   Deep Anaphora

The ellipsis of a VP in (31a) is bad, even though it can be inferred from the context that *break the windows* is the intended meaning. The deictic pronoun *this*, a deep anaphor, is completely felicitous.

It seems to be true that *one*-anaphora very straightforwardly takes pragmatically licensed antecedents (cf. Harley 2007, §4). Both cases in (32) are natural.

(32)   *Situation: Bill is in a room waiting for me to arrive. I walk into the room holding a plate of cookies, and Bill didn't know that I was going to bring them. Bill asks:*

    a.   Oh, can I have one?

    b.   Oh, can I have a big one?

Chisholm (2001:7) claims that NPE cannot be licensed pragmatically. Given the situation above this seems to be true:

(33)   *Situation: Bill is in a room waiting for me to arrive. I walk into the room holding a plate of cookies, and Bill didn't know that I was going to bring them. Bill asks:*

    a.   # Oh, can I have yours?   [*yours = your ⟨c̶o̶o̶k̶i̶e̶s̶⟩*]

    b.   # Oh, can I have one of yours?   [*yours = your ⟨c̶o̶o̶k̶i̶e̶s̶⟩*]

At first glance, this would seem to indicate that NPE and *one*-anaphora behave differently from one another, but one of the tricky problems with NPE licensing and pragmatic control is that speakers are very ready to infer antecedents from the surrounding (non-linguistic) context. In fact, Elbourne (2001:246–247) claims that NPE can be pragmatically licensed with some sort of "deictic aid". He provides an example like the following:

(34)   *Situation: Bill goes to visit Max. When Bill arrives, Max's dog leaps enthusiastically upon Bill. Max looks horrified, but Bill nods at the dog and says:*

    Don't worry. Mine does that all the time.   [*mine = my ⟨d̶o̶g̶⟩*]

To my ear, and to the ears of my informants, this example sounds pretty good in this context. If we follow Merchant (2004:§5), it may well be that conversational participants are capable of constructing or imagining antecedents for ellipses that lack legitimate ones in

Table 1: Summary of ellipsis diagnostics

	One	NPE	VPE
Permits missing antecedents	No	Yes	Yes
Permits extraction	No	??	Yes
Can be pragmatically licensed	Yes	No	No

an effort to accommodate the missing linguistic material. Regardless of how one chooses to explain the acceptability of (34), there must be some limitations on the process since no amount of deictic aid can save example (33). That is, deictic aid alone does not appear to be sufficient for the licensing of ellipsis.

Another potential confound, at least under Elbourne's approach to anaphoric *one*, has to do with the difference between indefinite determiners and the possessives. Indefinite determiners are often used to introduce or establish referents, as noted in Heim 1982, but possessives are definite and therefore presuppose that the referents of the DPs they head are in the common ground. The difference between (32a) and (33a), for example, could be attributed to their differing presuppositions. This does not strike me as a promising explanation, though. The unelided counterpart of (33a) is completely felicitous in the situation in (33):

(35)   Oh, can I have your cookies?

I share with Elbourne the assumption that phonologically deleted material is still interpreted by the semantics, and this means that there ought to be no semantic difference between (33a) and (35). Since they are structurally and semantically equivalent, it is unclear how they would differ with regard to their felicity conditions or their presuppositions. Thus, the difference between (32a) and (33a) cannot simply be reduced to the difference between licensing definites and indefinites. (33a) must therefore be bad due to the illegitimately licensed ellipsis.

The crucial point to take away here is that the pragmatic licensing conditions on anaphoric *one* and NPE are different. Pragmatic control does not license NPE, except under special circumstances, whereas *one*-anaphora can easily find referents in the non-linguistic environment.

3.4   Summary

In table 1, the outcome of the diagnostics above are compared with their outcomes for NPE and VPE. The results are fairly clear: Diagnostically, *one* anaphora does not pattern with the true ellipses. Therefore, it seems that neither Elbourne's nor Harley's approach to *one*-anaphora can be correct, since both are based on the premise that *one*-anaphora is derived via NPE. Even though each analysis covers a different subset of the empirical data, neither of those sets has been shown to behave like NPE.

4 Conclusion

I have shown in this paper that *one*-anaphora does not pattern with ellipsis phenomena. Therefore, theories that utilize NPE to derive *one*-anaphora, such as the one suggested by Elbourne and the one developed by Harley, ought to be rejected. Neither of these approaches provide any reason to think that *one*-anaphora should behave any differently from canonical NPE, but the diagnostics in §3 show that it does.

The trouble with the approaches discussed here is that they simply assume without question that *one*-anaphora is some sort of reflex of NPE. Elbourne's wider theory of E-type pronouns, in fact, makes this assumption throughout. As noted earlier, he assumes that the E-type pronouns are really just *the* + ⟨NP⟩:

(36)   Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it ⟨~~donkey~~⟩.

This simply begs the question. If *the* really licenses ellipsis of its complement, then one should be able to show that ellipsis is actually occurring. Elbourne never does this, and in light of the observations above, there is reason to suspect that the assumptions there need a stronger foundation.[12]

Returning to the focus of this paper, *one* really looks like it ought to be treated as a deep anaphor and not as the result of ellipsis. This seems to be clear, given the diagnostics, but there are a number of details that this leaves unresolved. Elbourne's approach provided an explanation for why *a* does not appear to license ellipsis, but since we now know that *a* cannot be equated with *one*, that explanation dissolves. The distribution of *one* also remains a mystery—why can't it occur immediately adjacent to possessives or the indefinite determiner?

These questions, while intriguing, are outside the scope of this paper. However, it is clear that whatever their answers may be, they should not involve NPE. Despite the intuitive appeal of connecting the two, *one*-anaphora is not ellipsis.

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12   Unfortunately, the diagnostics run into a handful confounds. Extraction out of definite DPs is usually blocked, so this test cannot be run. Definites presuppose the existence of their referents, so testing the MAP becomes very difficult. This, however, does not mean that the burden is not still on Elbourne to show that ellipsis is independently occurring in these situations.

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